Outbreaks of meningococcal disease, though rare in the United States, are devastating to the affected communities and require a rapid public health response. In the 1990s, an increase in serogroup C meningococcal disease outbreaks was reported in the United States, leading the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) to develop guidance for the investigation and response to meningococcal disease outbreaks [1, 2] . In this guidance, published in 1997 and updated in 2013, an outbreak was defined as ≥3 cases of the same serogroup with an attack rate of >10 cases per 100 000 population during a 3-month period.
Since the late 1990s, the overall incidence of meningococcal disease has declined 10-fold, from 1.2 cases per 100 000 population in 1997 to 0.12 cases per 100 000 population in 2016 [3] . In addition, quadrivalent meningococcal conjugate (MenACWY) and serogroup B meningococcal vaccines have become available and are recommended by the ACIP for certain groups, including persons at increased risk of meningococcal disease during an outbreak [4, 5] . With the evolving epidemiology of meningococcal disease and availability of additional vaccine interventions, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued revised guidance in 2017 for the response to meningococcal disease outbreaks in the United States [6] .
The epidemiology of meningococcal disease outbreaks in the United States during recent years of low meningococcal disease incidence is not well described. We sought to improve characterization of meningococcal disease outbreaks to help inform revisions to the guidance for public health response to meningococcal disease outbreaks. In this evaluation, we identify and characterize outbreaks of meningococcal disease due to any serogroup in the United States from 2009 to 2013, and we describe features of outbreak-associated cases and strains.
METHODS
In the United States, surveillance for meningococcal disease is conducted by all states and territories, and cases are reported to CDC through the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS). Cases are classified by state and local public health personnel according to the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists case definition [7, 8] . In addition to NNDSS, active population-and laboratory-based surveillance for meningococcal disease is conducted through Active Bacterial Core surveillance in 10 states with an estimated population under surveillance of 44 million persons (14% of US population) [9] . Cases for this analysis were identified through NNDSS; data from the Active Bacterial Core surveillance and state health departments were used to complete missing data from NNDSS for certain variables of interest (eg, serogroup and outcome).
Although the association of a case with an outbreak of meningococcal disease is collected through NNDSS, this variable is often incomplete or not accurately reported. Thus, a request for information on outbreak-associated cases was issued in 2014 through the Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X), the CDC's system for rapid and secure exchange of public health information between the CDC, state and local health departments, and other public health professionals. State and local health departments were asked to review all confirmed and probable meningococcal disease cases reported from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2013, to identify any outbreaks of meningococcal disease. For this request, the outbreak threshold described elsewhere [2] was broadened to capture additional clusters of related cases that may not meet the defined threshold.
An outbreak was defined as ≥2 primary cases (ie, cases occurring in the absence of previous known close contact with another patient) of the same serogroup within <3 months in an organization or an increase in disease rates in a community or a specific population within a community (twice the rate during the same time period in prior years). Outbreaks were classified as organization-based if there was a common affiliation of cases other than a shared geographic area, and community-based if there was no common affiliation of cases other than a shared geographic area. All 50 states and the District of Columbia responded to this request for information.
States that identified outbreak-associated cases during the evaluation period were asked to complete a supplemental questionnaire to describe characteristics of each outbreak, including common affiliations among cases, the size of the population from which the cases originated, and whether mass vaccination or expanded chemoprophylaxis campaigns (in which antibiotics are administered to persons not known to be close contacts of a case) were conducted. Reported outbreaks were excluded if the specified outbreak definition was not met.
Information on outbreak-associated cases was linked to NNDSS case records. Each case of invasive meningococcal disease was classified as outbreak-associated if reported as such by a state or local health department, or sporadic if not reported as an outbreak-associated case by the health department. For outbreak-associated cases with isolates available, multilocus sequence typing analysis was performed to assess the clonal complex (CC) and sequence type (ST) distribution, using Sanger sequencing and/or whole-genome sequencing, as described elsewhere [10, 11] .
A descriptive analysis of meningococcal disease outbreaks as well as demographic characteristics, clinical features, and outcome of outbreak-associated and sporadic cases was conducted. All analyses were conducted using SAS software (version 9.4). Because information on meningococcal disease outbreaks, characteristics of the outbreak, and outbreak response measures are not routinely or completely collected through surveillance systems, information is not available for outbreaks that started after 2013.
All data were deidentified before transmission and analysis at CDC. This evaluation was determined by human subjects review at the CDC to be public health nonresearch, and institutional review board review was not required. Among the 17 organization-based outbreaks (Table 1 and  Supplementary Table 1 ), 8 (47.1%) occurred in university populations, of which 6 (75.0%) were due to serogroup B. Nine outbreaks (52.9%) occurred in other types of organizations, including a healthcare facility, elementary school, high school, adult educational community, long-term care facility, correctional facility, homeless shelter, hockey league, and child care center; 5 (55.6%) of these outbreaks were due to serogroup C, and 2 (22.2%) to serogroup B. The organization type for the single serogroup A outbreak was described as an educational community from southeast Asia.
RESULTS

From
The median patient ages were similar in university outbreaks and outbreaks in other organization types (19 vs 22 years), though the age range was broader for other organization-based outbreaks (1-92 years). The median number of cases was 3 for both university and other organization-based outbreaks, with similar ranges (2-10 cases in university outbreaks, 2-8 in nonuniversity outbreaks). However, with differences in the median population size (20 000 for university and 1000 for other organization types), the median attack rate for university outbreaks was lower than for other organization types (33 vs 317 cases per 100 000, respectively). Universities had a longer outbreak duration than other organization types (74 vs 9 days, respectively).
Of 19 community-based outbreaks (Table 1 and  Supplementary Table 1) , 2 (10.5%) were serogroup C outbreaks among men who have sex with men (MSM). Among non-MSM community-based outbreaks, 8 (47.1%) were due to serogroup C and 7 (41.2%) to serogroup B. The median patient age in MSM outbreaks was 37.5 years. The median patient age in non-MSM community outbreaks was 17.5 years, but this varied by serogroup: 3.5 years for serogroup B and 20 years for serogroup C outbreaks. Compared with other community outbreaks, outbreaks among MSM had a higher median number of cases (13 vs 3 cases), cumulative attack rate (11.9 vs 0.6 cases per 100 000 population), and longer duration (509 vs 56 days).
Overall, the majority of outbreak-associated cases occurred in persons who were male (65.4%), white (70.3%), non-Hispanic (75.7%), and aged 1-24 years (55.0%). More than half (53.0%) of outbreak-associated cases were due to serogroup C, and the case-fatality rate for outbreak-associated cases was 24.2%. However, characteristics of outbreak-associated cases differed by outbreak type. The majority of organization-based outbreak-associated cases occurred in persons aged 11-24 years, were due to serogroup B, and involved a clinical presentation of meningitis. In community-based outbreaks, the age distribution of case patients was broader, and a greater proportion of cases occurred in Hispanics, were due to serogroup C, and presented with bacteremia. The case-fatality rates in organization-and community-based outbreaks were 19.1% and 27.3%, respectively (Table 2) .
Sixty-two isolates from 22 outbreaks were available for further characterization. Among the 12 serogroup C outbreaks with available isolates, 11 (91.7%) were due to CC11 (10 ST11 and 1 ST10215) and 1 to CC32 (ST32). Among the 7 serogroup B outbreaks with available isolates, 2 were due to CC32 (ST32), 2 to CC269 (1 ST269 and 1 ST283), 1 to CC4144 (ST409), 1 to CC11 (ST11), and 1, though epidemiologically defined as an outbreak, included 2 CCs (CC32 and CC41/44) and 3 STs.
(Supplementary Table 1 ). Among the 33 outbreaks (91.7%) for which information was available, a public health intervention was implemented in 16 (48.5%): a mass vaccination campaign alone was conducted in 6 outbreaks, expanded chemoprophylaxis alone in 5, and both mass vaccination and expanded chemoprophylaxis in 5. Implementation of one or both of these interventions was more common in organization-based (75.0%) than in community-based (23.5%) outbreaks. Coverage of each intervention was not determined, because the size of the intervention target group was not known in the majority of outbreaks. However, the numbers of doses administered for each intervention are listed in Supplementary Table 1. Of the 3 organizations in which mass vaccination alone was implemented, 1 nonuniversity organization experienced an additional outbreak-associated case ≥10 days after conclusion of the vaccination campaign. After implementation of expanded chemoprophylaxis alone, 2 of 5 organizations (both universities) experienced additional outbreak-associated cases. After implementation of combined mass vaccination and expanded chemoprophylaxis in 4 organizations, no additional cases were reported. Among 3 community-based outbreaks in which vaccination alone was implemented, additional cases were identified after initiation of vaccination in the 2 outbreaks among MSM. No outcome information is available on the community-based outbreak in which both vaccination and expanded chemoprophylaxis were implemented.
DISCUSSION
Although the incidence of meningococcal disease is low in the United States, outbreaks remain a serious public health a Numbers in brackets represent denominators for each category.
b The "Other" category includes septic arthritis, pericarditis, and peritonitis.
concern. In this analysis, outbreak-associated cases accounted for approximately 5% of all reported cases of meningococcal disease, with differences in age distribution, predominant serogroup, and clinical presentation between community-and organization-based outbreaks. Serogroup C, which previously accounted for the majority of all US meningococcal disease outbreaks [12, 13] , remains the leading cause of community-based outbreaks; however, serogroup B is now the leading cause of organization-based outbreaks. The majority of outbreak strains characterized in this analysis belong to hyperinvasive lineages that are commonly detected in the United States [14] . Although serogroup Y accounts for approximately one-third of sporadic disease cases, it rarely causes outbreaks in the United States. In contrast to several other countries, where expansion of a hyperinvasive serogroup W clone has led to increased rates of disease [15] [16] [17] , the proportions of cases and outbreaks due to serogroup W remained low in the United States during the evaluation period and in subsequent years [18] . In our evaluation, the majority of organization-based outbreak cases occurred in male subjects and in persons aged 11-24 years, which corresponds to the demographic groups with highest oropharyngeal carriage rates [19, 20] . In community-based outbreaks, more than one-third of cases were reported in persons of Hispanic ethnicity. However, these results were driven by a small number of outbreaks in which a relatively high proportion of cases occurred in Hispanic persons. Hispanic ethnicity has not previously been described as a factor associated with US community-based outbreaks to our knowledge. Although clinical presentation data were missing for a high proportion (>50%) of our cases, we speculate that the higher case-fatality rate for community-based outbreak cases observed in our evaluation may be related to high rates of meningococcemia, which has been associated with higher case fatality [21, 22] .
Outbreaks in university populations account for approximately 1 in 5 of all US outbreaks and half of all organization-based outbreaks. The shift in serogroup distribution from predominantly C [12] to B in this setting may be at least partially due to the success of the routine adolescent MenACWY vaccination program, with 82.2% coverage of ≥1 dose among 13-17-year-olds by 2016, in preventing both sporadic and outbreak-associated serogroup C meningococcal disease cases [23, 24] . Serogroup B university outbreaks, on the other hand, remain a concern; 7 additional clusters or outbreaks were reported in the United States from 2014 to 2017, and despite the recent availability of serogroup B meningococcal vaccines, outbreak response remains a challenge in these settings due to difficulties in achieving high coverage, particularly for the second and third vaccine doses, and other operational barriers [24] .
Community-based outbreaks of serogroup C disease among MSM are increasingly reported in the United States. Since 2010, a total of 5 such outbreaks have occurred (including 2 reported in our analysis) [3, 25, 26] . A recent analysis demonstrated that, though previously not recognized as a group at increased risk [4] , MSM in the United States have a higher incidence of meningococcal disease than men not known to be MSM. Although human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection seems to be an important factor, additional risk factors contributing to meningococcal disease and outbreaks in this population are not well described [27] . In 2016, the ACIP recommended that all HIVinfected persons aged ≥2 months should receive MenACWY vaccine [28] , which may also help mitigate the risk of meningococcal disease among MSM.
In the 2017 revised CDC guidance for the public health investigation and management of meningococcal disease outbreaks, a threshold using a specified attack rate is no longer used to define an outbreak; rather, health departments are encouraged to evaluate each outbreak on a case-by-case basis to determine the need for a vaccination campaign [6] . Similar to the outbreak definition used in this evaluation, in the revised guidance, an organization-based outbreak is defined as 2-3 outbreak-associated cases (ie, any case of the same serogroup unless found to be genetically unrelated to the outbreak strain by whole-genome sequencing), and a community-based outbreak is defined as multiple outbreak-associated cases (≥2) with an incidence above the expected meningococcal disease incidence in a community during a 3-month period.
The results of this analysis and experience gained from subsequent outbreaks support the CDC revision of the thresholds for considering vaccination during an outbreak. With incidence at historically low levels, currently 100 times lower than the previous outbreak threshold of 10 cases per 100 000 population, there is little tolerance for outbreak-associated cases that are potentially preventable through vaccination. The epidemiology of recent organization-based outbreaks supports this revised threshold. For example, before implementation of a vaccination campaign in 4 of the 6 serogroup B university outbreaks in our analysis, additional cases occurred once 2 cases were reported within a 3-month period.
For community-based outbreaks, a comparison against the baseline rate is often more useful than a uniform attack rate to determine whether an outbreak is ongoing. For instance, in the 2016 serogroup C community outbreak among MSM in Southern California, >20 cases were reported among MSM, although the cumulative attack rate reached only approximately 6 cases per 100 000. However, this rate is 10 times the annual incidence among MSM and 50 times the rate for of all men aged ≥18 years in the United States [26, 27] . The decision to implement a vaccination campaign, regardless of outbreak type, should take into account additional considerations, including the size of the population at risk, the ability to define a target group for vaccination, whether ongoing transmission is likely, and the feasibility of a vaccination campaign [6] .
Despite declines in the incidence of meningococcal disease in the United States, outbreaks continue to occur. Because current national surveillance systems do not completely or accurately capture outbreak-associated cases or information on outbreak characteristics and response measures, this evaluation is limited by the lack of information on outbreaks since 2014. Improvements in surveillance for meningococcal disease outbreaks are underway and will help in further characterizing outbreaks and identifying subgroups at greatest risk in order to guide and evaluate the impact of outbreak response measures.
